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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most controversial legal issues today is whether the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines· (Guidelines), which went into effect on No-
vember 1, 1987, are constitutional. As of October 2, 1988, at least 140 federal 
district courts have invalidated the Guidelines, while more than 100 courts 
have reached the opposite holding.2 On June 13, 1988, the United States 
Supreme Court invoked a rarely used procedure by granting a writ of certio-
rari before judgment in the court of appeals in the case of United States v. 
Mistretta; on October 5, 1988, the Court heard oral argument in the case.3 
Our highest court certified two issues for review: (1) whether the com-
position of the Commission, which consists of seven commissioners ap-
pointed by the President and is required to include three Article III judges 
as voting members, violates the doctrine of separation of powers; and (2) 
• B.A. Harvard 1983; J.D. Yale 1987; law clerk to Justice David M. Shea, Supreme Court 
of Connecticut, 1987·88; currently associated with Murtha, Cullina, Richter & Pinney, Hart-
ford, Conn. 
1. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-39, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified 
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
2. Spivack, High Court Entering Crucial Term, Hartford Courant, October 2, 1988, § AI, 
at A19. 
3. United States v. Mistretta, 682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.O. Mo. 1988), cert. granted, 108 S. 
Ct. 2818 (1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 647, 675 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of United 
States Sentencing Commission); see also 44 CRIM. L. REP. 1007·08 (Oct. 12, 1988) (oral argu· 
ment before the Supreme Court). 
377 
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whether Congress has unlawfully delegated legislative power to the Commis-
sion.· On January 18, 1989, the Court answered both questions in the 
negative. II 
There is a third major constitutional challenge to the Guidelines which 
the Supreme Court has not yet agreed to review. As of October, 1988, there 
were ten published decisions by federal district courts which had held that 
the Guidelines as formulated are substantively invalid because their rigid 
numerical formulas violate a defendant's due process rights under the fifth 
amendment to the United States Constitution by divesting courts of their 
traditional and fundamental function of exercising discretion in imposing 
individualized sentences according to the particulars of each case.6 Nine fed-
eral district courts have held that the Guidelines do not violate due process.' 
One can only speculate concerning the Supreme Court's reasons for certify-
ing a case involving separation of powers and legislative delegation issues, 
but not one addressing due process questions; it has been suggested, how-
ever, that the Court may have granted certiorari in Mistretta simply be-
cause it was the first available case, and not because the Court hoped to 
avoid confronting the due process issue.s In any event, the widespread un-
certainty about the constitutionality of the Guidelines will not be resolved 
until our highest court decides the due process challenge. 
It is difficult to determine whether due process requires individualized 
4. 43 CRIM. L. REP. 1041 (June 15, 1988). 
5. United States v. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. 647, 675 (1989). 
The Court's decision did not reach the issue of whether the Sentencing Guidelines violate 
the due process clause-the focus of this article. 
6. United States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1307-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. 
Scott, 688 F. Supp. 1483, 1494-95 (D.N.M. 1988); United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329, 
1355-57 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (speaking for all judges except one in E.D. Ark.); United States v. 
Brodies, 686 F. Supp. 941, 951-55 (D.D.C. 1988); United States v. Perez, 685 F. Supp. 990, 
1000-03 (W.D. Tex. 1988); United States v. Elliott, 684 F. Supp. 1535, 1541 (D. Colo. 1988); 
United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1512-14 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (en bane-fourteen 
judges held that the Guidelines violate due process; ten judges dissented); United States v. 
Martinez-Ortega, 684 F. Supp. 634, 636 (D. Idaho 1988); United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 
1003,1005 (D. Md. 1988) (en bane); United States v. Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815, 817-19 (W.D. Pa. 
1988). However, in an opinion reversing one of the most important of these decisions, the Third 
Circuit has held that the Guidelines do not violate due process. United States v. Franks, 44 
Crim. L. Rep. 2137, 2137-39 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 1988), rev'g 682 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. Pa. 1988). The 
Third Circuit emphasized that individualized sentencing was required only in capital cases. In 
non-capital cases Congress or judges were entitled to basic sentences on retribution or general 
deterrence rather than on individualized concerns. Id. at 2138. 
7. United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 1492-94 (D. Or. 1988); United States v. 
Macias-Pedroza, 694 F. Supp. 1406, 1417-18 (D. Ariz. 1988) (en bane); United States v. Franz, 
693 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ill. 1988); United States v. Weidner, 692 F. Supp. 968, 971-74 (N.D. Ind. 
1988); United States v. Rodriquez, 691 F. Supp. 1252, 1253-54 (W.D. Mo. 1988); United States 
v. Seluk, 691 F. Supp. 525, 539 (D. Mass. 1988); United States v. Landers, 690 F. Supp. 615, 
623-24 (W.D. Tenn. 1988); United States v. Alves, 688 F. Supp. 70, 79-80 (D. Mass. 1988); 
United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. 1174, 1181-84 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 
8. Prof. Daniel J. Freed, Yale Law School (personal communication). 
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sentencing because sentencing goals and practices have varied greatly during 
the course of this nation's history.9 A court applying Judge Bork's original 
intent doctrine of constitutional interpretation would probably reach a re-
sult different from that reached by a court employing a more liberal view of 
due process protections. 1o It is likely that liberals and conservatives on the 
current Supreme Court would disagree on whether the Guidelines violate 
due process. 
This article argues that the Guidelines can be saved and can satisfy due 
process requirements if the Supreme Court interprets the Sentencing Re-
form Act to permit departures from the prescribed sentence ranges in cases 
in which significant mitigating circumstances are present. Such an approach 
would have the added benefit of providing judicial feedback on the Guide-
lines that will be useful in constructing better sentence guidelines in the 
future. 
II. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Congress, through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, established the 
United States Sentencing Commission, which was given the task of con-
structing sentence guidelines to restrict the discretionary authority placed in 
judges by existing federal criminal statutes. The Act was the product of ap-
proximately fifteen years of scholarly debate during which most commenta-
tors criticized indeterminate sentence laws and the practice of allowing 
judges broad sentencing discretion. ll A number of commentators charged 
that indeterminate sentence statutes and broad judicial sentencing discre-
tion produced enormous sentence disparity-the sentencing of like cases dif-
ferently.12 Other scholars objected on the philosophical ground that 
sentences ought to be based on the seriousness of the offense commit-
ted-that is, on just desserts-rather than on rehabilitative grounds.13 Poli-
ticians clearly were eager to revise criminal sentencing statutes to satisfy a 
9. See infra notes 70-86 and accompanying text. 
10. [d. 
U. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
12. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972); P. 
O'DONNEL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: 
AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977); PANEL ON SENTENCING RESEARCH, NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (1983). It should be pointed out 
that these studies present evidence of possible sentence disparities; at least some of the dispar-
ity can be justified on the ground that judges are making predictions about each individual's 
rehabilitation, and therefore that defendants who have committed the same crime may deserve 
different sentences. Lowe, Modern Sentencing Reform: A Preliminary Analysis of the Pro-
posed Federal sentencing Guidelines, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1987) discusses the dispar-
ity issue and surveys the literature. 
13. See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT (1976); Ozanne, 
Bringing the Rule of Law to Criminal Sentencing: Judicial Review, Sentencing Guidelines and 
a Policy of Just Desserts, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 721 (1982). 
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public dissatisfied with a perceived "crime problem"; mandatory sentences 
were associated with "law and order" while rehabilitative indeterminate 
sentences were seen as too soft on criminals, although discretionary sentence 
laws in practice sometimes resulted in more time served in prison.14 
The Minnesota sentence guidelines became a model for reform in other 
jurisdictions. ltI Minnesota established a permanent sentencing commission, 
which produced a sentencing guidelines grid which went into effect in 
1980.16 It is important to examine the grid in detail because it established 
numerical sentence guidelines as the most popular means for sentencing re-
form, despite the availability of alternative methods such as more extensive 
appellate review of sentences or less prescriptive guidelines based on exam-
ples furnished by experienced sentencing judgesP 
Two scales determine the length of sentence in Minnesota.1s The first 
ranks the seriousness of the conviction offense on a scale of one to ten.19 The 
second rates the criminal history of the offender on a scale of from zero to 
six.20 Each serves as one of the two axes of the sentencing grid. After calcu-
lating the two scores, a Minnesota judge draws a line across from the verti-
cal axis and down from the horizontal axis to the box in which the two lines 
intersect. Each box in the grid contains either a fixed sentence or a very 
narrow sentence range established by the state sentencing commission.21 
Under certain limited circumstances a judge may depart from the sentence 
prescribed by the Minnesota sentence guidelines system, but such deviations 
may not be based on the offender's socioeconomic background.22 
The Minnesota model clearly had a major influence on Congress in the 
writing of the Act and the creation of the Commission in 1984. The Minne-
sota guidelines prohibit judges from considering an offender's socioeconomic 
background both because of the fear that such factors discriminate against 
14. Indeterminate sentencing has been criticized on the ground that it is inhumane be-
cause a prisoner can never be sure when a parole board will release him. See, e.g., P. O'DONNEL, 
supra note 12, at 82-83. The inhumane aspects of indeterminate sentences were criticized in 
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVo COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter AMERICAN FRIENDS). 
For a discussion of how the "law and order" political issues of the late 1960s and 1970s affected 
sentencing reform see Lowe, supra note 12, at 18 n.98; Zimring, Prisoners, Professors and Poli-
ticians-Sentencing Reform in the Decade of the Seventies in REFORM AND PUNISHMENT (M. 
Tonry & F. Zimring eds. 1983). 
15. For a good discussion of the Minnesota guidelines see Note, How Unreliable Factfind-
ing Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines, 95 YALE L.J. 1258, 1260-63 (1986). 
16. [d. at 1260. 
17. Appellate review of sentencing has generally been unsuccessful in the United States. 
See, e.g., Zalman, Appellate Review of Sentencing: The Antinomy of Law Reform, 4 DET. C.L. 
REV. 1513 (1983). 
18. Note, supra note 15, at 1260-62. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. 
22. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09, comment II.D.03(1) (West Supp. 1988). 
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racial minorities and because these issues are relevant only if the sentencing 
judge has some discretion to modify a sentence in light of the defendant's 
rehabilitative potential.i3 The Act mandated that the Commission establish 
sentencing guidelines which are "entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national 
origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders" and which "reflect the 
general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, 
employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of 
the defendant."24 The Act provided that sentence ranges within the Guide-
lines could be no greater than twenty-five percent, which was much less 
than in existing federal statutes but somewhat greater than the ranges in 
most categories of the Minnesota guidelines.2~ The Act also followed the 
Minnesota example by providing that judges would be permitted to depart 
from sentence guideline ranges only under very limited circumstances, 
which will be examined in depth below.26 
The Commission was clearly influenced by the highly numerical Minne-
sota guidelines when it wrote the first draft of the Guidelines. Many judges 
and scholars were critical of the extremely rigid numerical approach taken 
in the first draft of the Guidelines, although one commissioner, Professor 
Paul Robinson, dissented because the first draft did not go far enough in 
creating a new mathematical model for assessing offense behavior.27 A sec-
ond draft of the Guidelines took a far more lenient approach to departures 
and included sentence ranges in excess of the twenty-five percent mandated 
by statute.28 After extensive public debate about the draft Guidelines, the 
Commission issued its final version of the Guidelines, which went into effect 
on November 1, 1987.29 This article will discuss the Commission's policies 
concerning departures from the Guidelines' sentence ranges and judicial 
consideration of offender characteristics in detail in Section V. Before exam-
ining the due process implications a brief description of the Guidelines will 
be provided. 
The Guidelines follow a numerical grid scheme. There are forty-three 
offense severity ratings, and an offender's criminal history is rated on a scale 
23. See Mank, Corrections Law: The Role of Employment Factors in Sentencing, 24 
CRIM. L. BULL. 249, 249-53 (1988). 
24. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 994 (d) & (e) (West Supp. 1988). 
25. Compare UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046, § 5A (1987) (sentencing table with twenty-
five percent ranges) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES] with the Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines Grid, reproduced in Note, supra note 15, at 1261. 
26. For a discussion of departures under the Guidelines see infra notes 87-103 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of departures in Minnesota see Note, supra note 15, at 1263. 
27. See Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1987) 
(criticizing the Guidelines). 
28. [d. at 3-6. 
29. [d. 
HeinOnline -- 37 Drake L. Rev. 382 1987-1988
382 Drake Law Review [Vol. 37 
from one to six.sO There are 258 sentence boxes contained in the grid; each 
box contains a sentence range which usually measures twenty-five percent 
from maximum to minimum.sl Each major crime category is assigned a base 
offense level on the forty-three-point scale. For example, the base offense 
level for robbery is eighteen points.32 Points are added to the base offense 
level depending upon such variables as the amount of money stolen, the 
type and quantity of illegal drug sold, or the degree of bodily injury to the 
victim.s3 For instance, two points are added to the base of eighteen for rob-
bery if between $10,001 and $50,000 is stolen, and an additional four points 
would be added if the offender during the course of the robbery inflicted 
"serious bodily injury" upon one victim.s4 Let us suppose that the total of-
fense level is twenty-four points and that the defendant is a first offender. 
The sentencing table provides a range between fifty-one and sixty-three 
months.3~ 
Federal judges retain some discretion under the Guidelines, but far less 
than before. s6 There is a twenty-five percent range between the maximum 
and minimum sentence in the Guidelines' sentencing table.s7 Judges have 
much less freedom, however, to grant probation in lieu of a prison sen-
tence.a8 Under the Guidelines probation is limited to offenders whose mini-
mum sentence is not greater than six months.a9 Thus, many first offenders 
who might have received probation from a sentencing judge who believed 
that the crime was an aberration which would not be repeated would receive 
a substantial prison term under the Guidelines:o It is estimated that the 
federal prison population will substantially increase in the wake of the 
Guidelines, although this increase will be due not only to the new restric-
tions on probation but also to the fact that parole has been abolished for 
federal prisoners sentenced under the Guidelines:l 
Federal judges do retain some limited discretion in making certain ad-
justments permitted under the Guidelines. Judges may adjust the offense 
level up or down by a few points if the following circumstances exist: the 
victim was especially vulnerable; the defendant played a role in organizing a 
30. GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at § 5A (sentencing table). 
31. [d. 
32. [d. at § 2B3.1(a). 
33. [d. passim. 
34. [d. at §§ 2B3.1(b)(I)(C) & 2B3.1(b)(3)(B). 
35. [d. at § 5A. 
36. Calve, Commissioner Defends Controversial Guidelines, 14 Conn. L. Tribune, No. 20, 
May 16, 1988, at 11 (Judge Stephen Breyer, one of the seven commissioners on the Commis-
sion, stated that the Guidelines reduced but did not eliminate judicial discretion). 
37. GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at § 5A. 
38. [d. at § 5B1.1(a)(2). 
39. [d. 
40. Murphy, Penalties for Federal Crimes Made Stricter Under New Law, Hartford Cou-
rant, Nov. 1, 1987, at A4. 
41. [d. 
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criminal activity that involved five or more participants; the defendant was 
a minimal participant; the defendant willfully obstructed the investigation 
or prosecution of the offense; the defendant was convicted of multiple 
counts; or the defendant accepted responsibility for the crime-for example, 
by pleading guilty or by acting as a government witness. '2 These adjust-
ments require the judge to make judgment calls-for instance, a judge can 
add four points if the defendant was an "organizer or leader of a criminal 
activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive" 
but may add only three points if the defendant was merely a "manager or 
supervisor."'3 The judge retains some discretion in determining whether a 
defendant's criminal conduct fits into box A or box B of the Guidelines. It 
should be noted that government prosecutors still retain enormous power to 
determine the sentence through plea bargaining." 
While judges have some discretion under the Guidelines, there are cer-
tain factors which may not be considered in adjusting the offense level. Pro-
fessor Alschuler has argued that the Guidelines fail to take into account 
" 'situational' characteristics-for example, whether the offense was a 'stran-
ger' or a 'nonstranger' crime."41i He and other commentators have criticized 
the failure of the Guidelines to consider important offender characteris-
tics-for example, whether the crime was motivated by personal financial 
difficulties.'6 
III. DUE PROCESS AND THE GUIDELINES 
Ten district courts have held that the Guidelines violate due process, 
while nine have reached the opposite conclusion.'7 Those courts which have 
held that the Guidelines violate due process have emphasized that defend-
ants are entitled to have a meaningful opportunity to present mitigating evi-
dence to a sentencing judge who has enough discretion to make an individu-
alized sentence.'8 On the other hand, courts holding that the Guidelines 
satisfy due process requirements have emphasized that mandatory sentences 
are constitutional and that individualized sentencing is required only in cap-
ital cases.'9 The Supreme Court has never embraced the question whether 
42. GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at §§ 3A1.1 through 3E1.1. 
43. [d. at §§ 3B1.l(a) & (b). 
44. See Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 
117 F.R.D. 459, 470-76 (1988). 
45. [d. at 462-63. 
46. See id. at 462-65. For a criticism of the tendency of sentencing guidelines to ignore 
the significance of the work records and vocational skills of offenders see Mank, supra note 23, 
at 249-53. 
47. See supra notes 6 & 7. 
48. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text. 
49. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. 
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individualized sentencing is mandatory in noncapital cases. In Section IV, 
this article argues that the due process issue can be understood only in the 
context of the historical development of American sentencing laws. 
A. The Guidelines Violate Due Process 
Courts which have held that the Guidelines violate due process have 
acknowledged that mandatory sentencing statutes may pass constitutional 
muster in some circumstances, but have concluded that Congress may not 
give judges some discretion and then effectively take it away. One court 
stated: "It is true that Congress may have the power to fix definite sentences 
for crime. However, once Congress has decided to set only a permissible 
range of sentences for each crime, it creates a sphere of discretion. That 
discretion is properly judicial in nature."110 Another district court concluded: 
We do not hold that the Constitution guarantees to a defendant (at least 
in non-capital cases) "individualized sentencing." However, when a defi-
nite sentence is not statutorily mandated, a defendant being deprived of 
his liberty pursuant to a statute which sets a sentencing range is consti-
tutionally entitled to an articulated exercise of discretion by the judge 
before whom he appears rather than to the mechanical application of 
formulae adopted by non-constitutional commissioners invisible to him 
and to the general public. 51 
Some courts have held that the Guidelines violate due process because 
defendants are constitutionally entitled to present mitigating evidence con-
cerning their social background and to have a judge weigh their individual 
potential for rehabilitation and culpability. One district court concluded 
that the right to individualized sentencing ought to be extended from capi-
tal cases to noncapital cases. "The Court . . . finds guidance in Supreme 
Court decisions which mandate that a sentencing judge or jury cannot be 
restricted from considering all relevant mitigating circumstances when the 
death penalty is a possibility. . . [T]he Court's ability to consider such fac-
tors should not be determined by whether the defendant faces . . . a lesser 
term of incarceration."112 
At least three district courts have concluded that the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Barkerll3 prohibits the use of mechanical sen-
tencing formulas and that the Guidelines are of that nature.1i4 
50. United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329, 1355 (E.D. Ark. 1988). 
51. United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (D. Md. 1988) (en bane). 
52. United States v. Perez, 685 F. Supp. 990, 1002 (W.D. Tex. 1988). 
53. United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1985). 
54. United States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (relying on Barker 
for the proposition that "individualized sentencing is a defendant's right"); United States v. 
Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (same); United States v. Frank, 682 F. 
Supp. 815, 818 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 
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Quite simply, the mechanical formulas and resulting narrow ranges of 
sentences prescribed by the Guidelines violate defendants' right to due 
process of law under the Fifth Amendment by divesting the Court of its 
traditional and fundamental function of exercising its discretion in im-
posing individualized sentences according to the particular facts of each 
case. See United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1985) (appli-
cation of mechanical sentencing procedures violates due process) .... 
The guidelines do require a court to consider certain enumerated factors 
specific to individual offenders which are unrelated to their offense(s) of 
conviction. However, the rigid, computerized nature of the guide-
lines-which assign positive or negative numerical values to various sen-
tencing factors and 'adjustments'-precludes the trial court from weigh-
ing the importance of aggravating and mitigating factors relating to both 
the offender and the offenses of conviction. (United States v. Frank, 682 
F. Supp. 815, 819 (W.D. Pa. 1988).) This weighing responsibility of the 
trial judge rests at the core of due process. Id. at 819. Further, the 
Guidelines offend the guarantees of due process by depriving the defend-
ant of the opportunity to affect the court's weighing of all relevant fac-
tors at the time of sentencing. Id. 55 
385 
In Subsections Band C, this article will examine whether Barker should be 
interpreted to prohibit the use of numerical sentencing guidelines. 
One district court has argued that the Guidelines violate a defendant's 
due process right to be sentenced on accurate information because courts 
must sentence based on prescribed formulas rather than upon the individual 
facts of a particular case.56 Another district court has made a similar argu-
ment in contending that the "formulaic nature of the Guidelines create a 
great risk of error by giving inadequate consideration to the particular facts 
of a defendant's case."57 Other district courts have concluded that the 
Guidelines violate basic due process principles by lumping together different 
defendants within the same numerical box. 
The Guidelines exemplify the arrogance of quantification. If a sen-
tencing judge, under the prior system, lumped all defendants into catego-
ries based on broad generalizations, he would rightly be accused of abus-
ing his discretion. But that is precisely how the Guidelines operate. The 
heart of prejudice and bigotry is generalization. The independence of the 
federal judiciary and its substantial discretion in sentencing matters over 
the past century has provided a protection against these evils. The 
Guidelines represent a substantial retreat from the goal of providing each 
individual criminal defendant a fair and unbiased sentence following 
conviction. 58 
Yet another district court has held that the prescriptive point system em-
55. United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. at 1513. 
56. United States v. Scott, 688 F. Supp. 1483, 1495 (D.N.M. 1988). 
57. United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. at 1513. 
58. United States v. Martinez-Ortega, 684 F. Supp. 634, 636 (D. Idaho 1988). 
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ployed by the Guidelines violates due process because such a scheme oper-
ates in the same manner as "conclusive presumptions which consistently 
have been held to constitute a denial of due process."~9 Thus, while these 
district courts have employed somewhat different rationales, they have all 
reached the conclusion that rigid numerical guidelines are insensitive to in-
dividual differences among defendants, and therefore violate due process. 
It is clear that those judges who have held that the Guidelines violate 
due process believe-either explicitly or implicitly-that they can do a bet-
ter job than numerical grids in assessing offender culpability and in judging 
the rehabilitative potential of each defendant.60 
B. The Guidelines Do Not Violate Due Process 
The nine district courts which have held that the Guidelines do not 
violate due process have explicitly rejected most of the arguments made in 
Subsection A. First, those courts which have upheld the validity of the 
Guidelines in the face of a due process challenge have pointed out that 
mandatory or fixed sentences for a crime are clearly constitutional. 61 Sec-
ond, they have relied on the fact that the Supreme Court has required indi-
vidualized sentencing only in the context of capital cases.62 Third, two dis-
trict courts have contended that the Guidelines are compatible with the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Barker. While the basis of 
United States v. Barker is that a judge cannot refuse to exercise discretion 
given by statute, the case does not state that there is a constitutional right 
to individualized sentencing.63 
Courts rejecting the due process challenge have attacked the assump-
tions that the Guidelines prevent defendants from presenting significant 
mitigating evidence, and therefore increase the risk that an individual de-
fendant will receive an inappropriate sentence based on rigid point systems 
prescribed by the Commission. 
We fail to see how the guidelines' limitations on judicial discretion will 
increase the risk of error. The concept of "error" assumes that there is a 
correct sentence for each crime and offender. But sentencing is not a fac-
tual determination so much as a value judgment in which there is no 
correct result . . . . The guidelines do not alter the defendant's right to 
challenge the factual premises underlying his sentencing and the court's 
59. United States v. Elliott, 684 F. Supp. 1535, 1541 (D. Colo. 1988). 
60. See generally supra note 6 and supra notes 50·59 and accompanying text. 
61. United States v. Franz, 693 F. Supp. 687,690 (N.D. Ill. 1988); United States v. Weid-
ner, 692 F. Supp. 968, 971-72 (N.D. Ind. 1988); United States v. Landers, 690 F. Supp. 615, 624 
(W.D. Tenn. 1988); United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. 1174,1183 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 
62. United States v. Franz, 693 F. Supp. at 690; United States v. Weidner, 692 F. Supp. at 
971-72; United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. at 1184. 
63. United States v. Weidner, 692 F. Supp. at 971-72; United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. 
at 1183. 
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obligation to ensure that the sentence is based on reliable information.e• 
Another district court has concluded that Congress has the power to assign 
predetermined values to certain offense or offender factors. The court 
stated: "Due process no more affords a defendant the right to contest Con-
gress' evaluation of certain crime related factors than it does to contest Con-
gress' evaluation of the need for a specific sentence for certain crimes."61i 
Finally, three district courts emphasized that sentencing judges still retain 
considerable sentencing discretion under the Guidelines.66 
C. Existing Precedent Is Unclear 
A crucial question, of course, is how the Supreme Court is likely to rule 
when it eventually reviews the due process challenge to the Guidelines. It is 
important to observe that more district court judges, at this time, have held 
that the Guidelines violate due process than have taken the opposite view, 
but that fact alone is not determinative. It is fair to say that those courts 
which have held that the Guidelines violate due process have extended and 
broadly construed previous decisions defining due process requirements for 
sentencing. The Supreme Court has required individualized sentencing only 
in capital cases. Three district court decisions striking down the Guidelines 
have relied in part upon Barker for the proposition that mechanical sen-
tencing procedures violate due process.67 In Barker, however, the district 
court had imposed the maximum five-year sentence permitted by statute on 
all five defendants convicted of smuggling marijuana despite significant dif-
ferences in the culpability of the defendants, and in the face of a govern-
ment recommendation that two defendants receive a sentence of one year 
and that the other three defendants serve eighteen months.6s While the 
Guidelines limit judicial discretion to some extent, adjustments are made in 
64. United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. at 1184. 
65. United States v. Franz, 693 F. Supp. at 691; United States v. Landers, 690 F. Supp. at 
624. 
66. United States v. Weidner, 692 F. Supp. at 972-73; United States v. Alves, 688 F. Supp. 
70, 79 (D. Mass. 1988); United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. at 1184. 
A recent Second Circuit decision, United States v. Correa-Vargas, No. 88-1167 (2d Cir. Oct. 
18, 1988), 44 CRIM. L. REP. 2077 (Nov. 2, 1988), emphasized that trial judges have considerable 
discretion to depart from the Guidelines. In Correa- Vargas, the defendant had been caught 
with twenty kilos of relatively pure cocaine. Prosecutors allowed him to plead guilty to one 
count of using a telephone in the commission of a drug offense-a crime for which "amount" is 
not an offense characteristic, according to the Guidelines. The sentencing judge, however, used 
the amount of the drug as justification for departing from the Guidelines and imposing a statu-
tory maximum term of forty-eight months. The Second Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that 
judges may depart from the Guidelines in appropriate circumstances. The decision supports the 
reasoning of those district courts which have upheld the Guidelines on the ground that judges 
retain discretion to depart from Guideline sentence ranges. 
67. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
68. United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1363-69 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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the offense level determinations based, for example, on an offender's role in 
a drug distribution network, on the amount and type of drugs sold, and on 
the offender's willingness to cooperate with the government.8D The Guide-
lines do not impose sentences in the same arbitrary manner as did the dis-
trict judge in Barker. 
Neither the Supreme Court nor the federal circuit courts of appeal have 
faced the question whether individualized sentencing is required in noncapi-
tal cases. This issue can be resolved only by studying the history of Ameri-
can sentencing to understand whether individualized sentencing is a funda-
mental guarantee in our legal tradition. 
IV. DUE PROCESS AND THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN SENTENCING 
There are three major periods in the history of American sentencing. 
First, during the colonial period and to some extent until the middle nine-
teenth century, judges had little sentencing discretion.70 From the late nine-
teenth century until the late 1960s, there was a heavy emphasis on rehabili-
tating offenders and judges had great discretion to tailor individualized 
sentences.71 Finally, in the 1970s and 1980s, there has been a strong empha-
sis on limiting judicial discretion and on a just desserts sentencing philoso-
phy, and reduced emphasis on rehabilitating offenders.72 An advocate of 
Judge Bork's original intent approach to constitutional interpretation could 
find ample support for the view that fixed sentences meet due process stan-
dards as they existed in 1787. On the other hand, a jurist who believes that 
due process standards evolve with the development of civilization could 
point to many judicial opinions in which individualized, rehabilitative sen-
tencing is seen as a tremendous advance over the fixed sentences of the colo-
nial era.73 The problem, of course, is that judges of different schools of con-
stitutional interpretation and political philosophy cannot agree upon the 
meaning of due process. 
During the colonial era fixed sentences were the norm and rehabilita-
tion was not a consideration in sentencing. In United States v. Grayson," 
Chief Justice Burger gave the following description of colonial sentencing 
practices: "In the early days of the Republic, when imprisonment had only 
69. GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at §§ 2D & 3E1.1. 
70. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
71. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text; infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. Judge Sweet, in United States v. 
Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1307-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), heavily relied on the historical evolution of 
sentencing toward individualized sentencing as the basis for his holding that the Guidelines 
violated due process. However, in United States v. Franz, 693 F. Supp. 687, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1988), 
the court cited United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), for the principle that narrow 
sentence ranges do not offend due process because such sentence ranges have been used "for 
centuries. " 
74. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978). 
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recently emerged as an alternative to the death penalty, confinement in 
public stocks, or whipping in the town square, the period of incarceration 
was generally prescribed with specificity by the legislature. Each crime had 
its defined punishment."75 Colonial Americans did not believe that anyone, 
let alone criminals, could be rehabilitated given their belief in original sin 
and the basic depravity of all human beings.76 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, fixed sentencing statutes 
were gradually modified to allow judges some discretion, but sentence ranges 
were very narrow." Rehabilitation was not yet an important sentencing goal. 
According to Chief Justice Burger: "Nevertheless, the focus remained on the 
crime: Each particular offense was to be punished in proportion to the social 
harm caused by it and according to the offender's culpability. . . . The pur-
pose of incarceration remained, primarily, retribution and punishment."78 
About 1870 there began a significant change in the goals of sentencing, 
at least in part due to the work of the National Prison Congress.79 In 1870 
New York enacted the first important penal statute to emphasize individu-
alized sentencing.80 In Grayson, Chief Justice Burger described this funda-
mental shift in sentencing philosophy: 
Approximately a century ago, a reform movement asserting that the pur-
pose of incarceration, and therefore the guiding consideration in sentenc-
ing, should be rehabilitation of the offender, dramatically altered the ap-
proach to sentencing. A fundamental proposal of this movement was a 
flexible sentencing system permitting judges and correctional personnel, 
particularly the latter, to set the release date of prisoners according to 
informed judgments concerning their potential for, or actual, rehabilita-
tion and their likely recidivism.81 
In William v. New York,82 the Supreme Court strongly endorsed indi-
vidualized sentencing in holding that a sentencing judge may exercise wide 
discretion as to the type of information about the defendant's social back-
ground which is considered in determining the sentence. 
Highly relevant-if not essential-to his selection of an appropriate sen-
tence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant's life and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing 
punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge 
not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a re-
75. [d. at 45. 
76. A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 2, at 9 (1978); REPORT OF TWENTIETH CENTURY 
FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 83 (1976) (back· 
ground paper by Alan Dershowitz) [hereinafter TASK FORCE). 
77. TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 87. 
78. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46. 
79. TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 93. 
80. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 76, § 2, at 12; TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 95. 
81. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46. 
82. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949). 
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quirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly ap-
plicable to the trial. 83 
Justice Black in his majority opinion treated the colonial approach to sen-
tencing as a dark age from which a civilized America had finally emerged: 
Undoubtedly the New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modern phi-
losophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not 
merely the crime . . . . The belief no longer prevails that every offense in 
a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to 
the past life and habits of a particular offender. This whole country has 
traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an auto-
matic and commonplace result of convictions-even for offenses today 
deemed trivial . . . . Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of 
the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have be-
come important goals of criminal jurisprudence.8• 
Williams did not hold that defendants have a due process right to individu-
alized sentencing, but it suggested that any other approach was less than 
civilized. The rhetoric of Williams was echoed in many subsequent opinions, 
so that individualized sentencing became the ideal. Chief Justice Burger, 
clearly a judicial conservative, concluded in Grayson that "it is 
proper-indeed even necessary for the rational exercise of discretion-to 
consider the defendant's whole person and personality . . . . "8~ 
There is certainly support in Williams and its progeny for the view that 
modern conceptions of due process demand that a defendant be sentenced 
based on the court's evaluation of his rehabilitative potential and the likeli-
hood of recidivism. Nonetheless, even if one does not accept Judge Bork's 
original intent theory of constitutional interpretation, there are certain 
problems with the argument that individualized sentencing is a necessary 
requirement of modern due process. Since the late 1960s a number of schol-
ars have criticized the individualized sentencing model advocated in Wil-
liams for the following reasons: (1) it is much more difficult to reform of-
fenders than was assumed by advocates of indeterminate rehabilitative 
sentencing; (2) it may be more fair to base the length of criminal sentences 
on a just desserts or retributive basis than to keep an offender in prison 
until a parole board decides he is "reformed"; (3) judicial discretion may 
lead to serious sentencing disparities.86 It is less clear today than it was in 
83. [d. at 247. 
84. [d. at 247-48. 
85. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 53. 
86. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 
98, and J. Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975) (in late 1960s scholars began questioning 
rehabilitative model). A number of scholars in the past fifteen years have argued that rehabili-
tation does not work for most offenders. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITA-
TIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND PURPOSE (1981); Lowe, supra note 12, at 18-19 nn.95-99 (citing 
Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of Rehabilitation, 
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1949 when the Supreme Court decided in Williams that individualized sen-
tencing is good policy. On the other hand, an argument can still be made 
that offenders ought to be treated as individuals rather than as numbers in a 
computerized Guidelines system. 
It is likely that so called "conservative" and "liberal" justices on the 
Supreme Court would disagree over whether the Guidelines violate due pro-
cess. There may be a way, however, to avoid a divisive split on this critical 
issue. 
V. DEPARTURES 
This article argues that the Guidelines can be saved from due process 
challenges if the Supreme Court interprets the Act to allow departures from 
the guideline sentence ranges in a significant number of cases. Such an in-
terpretation could allow the Court to reach a consensus on this fundamental 
issue and might achieve better policy results than a rigid adherence to the 
sentencing table in the Guidelines. 
Those courts which have held that the Guidelines violate due process 
have explicitly or implicitly assumed that the system allows very little judi-
cial discretion.87 On the other hand, three of the district courts which have 
rejected due process challenges to the Guidelines have concluded that the 
Commission has left substantial discretion in the hands of the federal 
judiciary.88 
A critical issue in determining the amount of judicial discretion allowed 
under the Guidelines is the extent to which judges may depart from the 
guideline ranges. The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act mandated that judges 
could depart from the ranges established in the Guidelines only in very lim-
ited circumstances.89 The Commission, however, adopted a more liberal pol-
icy toward departures, and Congress has recently amended the Act in this 
area.90 Thus, there is a sound basis for concluding that the Guidelines per-
mit enough judicial discretion to meet due process requirements. 
The 1984 Act specified that a judge could depart from the guideline 
range only when a case involved a factor "that was not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guide-
lines .... "91 Obviously, the word "adequately" was open to interpretation. 
Professor Paul Robinson, one of the seven original commissioners, has ar-
gued that the legislative history and language of the 1984 version of the Act 
demonstrate that Congress intended to severely restrict departures.92 He 
7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29 (1978)). 
87. See supra note 6; supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1985). 
90. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text. 
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1985). 
92. Robinson, supra note 27, at 2-5. 
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points out that the Commission was mandated by statute to consider a very 
wide range of offense and offender characteristics.93 Professor Alschuler, 
who tends to favor a liberal policy toward departures, has conceded that the 
Act as originally written in 1984 was intended to "confine judicial discretion 
narrowly."94 
At first the Commission intended to adopt a restrictive policy toward 
allowing judicial departures from the Guidelines, but the final version of the 
system invited judges to depart from the official sentence ranges.95 The 
Commission explained that it had adopted this policy because of "the diffi-
culty of foreseeing and capturing a single set of guidelines that encompasses 
the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing deci-
sion."96 It is also likely that the Commission adopted a more liberal depar-
ture policy in the wake of complaints from judges and academics that the 
first draft of the Guidelines was too restrictive.97 
Congress apparently agreed with the Commission's decision to adopt a 
more liberal policy in regard to departures, because the statutory standard 
for departures was amended soon after the final version of the Guidelines 
went into effect. The Act now authorizes departures when "there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, that was 
not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Commission in formu-
lating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that de-
scribed."98 This amendment was approved by the House of Representatives 
on November 16, the Senate on November 20, and the President on Decem-
ber 7, 1987.99 
This amendment could be read either broadly or narrowly on its face, 
but if a narrow interpretation would result in the Act and Guidelines being 
held in violation of due process, then established principles of statutory con-
struction demand that the amendment be construed so that the Act meets 
constitutional requirements.1oo One district court has explicitly held that the 
93. [d. at 2-3 n.6. 
94. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 460. 
95. Robinson, supra note 27, at 3-4; GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 18,050. 
96. GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 18,050. 
97. See, e.g., Van Graafeiland, Some Thoughts on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,31 
VILL. L. REV. 1291, 1292-94 (1986) (federal judge criticizes first draft version of the Guidelines 
for being too restrictive). The Ninth Circuit has held that the enumerated grounds for depar-
tures from the Guidelines are not exhaustive and that departures may be made on grounds not 
mentioned in the Guidelines. United States v. Nino-Huizar, 859 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1988). The 
court also held that unguided departures from the Guidelines should be applied in the atypical 
or unusual case, where the conduct differs significantly from the norm. [d. 
98. Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, 101 Stat. 1279 (1987) (emphasis added). 
This amendment is discussed in Alschuler, supra note 44, at 460 n.4. 
99. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 460 n.4. 
100. Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir. 1970) 
("Although the courts should try, whenever possible, to construe statutes to avoid a constitu-
tional infirmity, they may not, in doing so, rewrite the statute or do violence to its plain lan-
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amendment was insufficient to save the Guidelines, and the other courts 
which have held that the Guidelines violate due process have apparently 
taken the same view in this regard, because all of these cases have been 
decided since the passage of the amendment. 101 Professor Alschuler has 
noted that the amendment could be interpreted either narrowly or 
broadly.102 Courts as a matter of policy seek to interpret statutes to avoid 
constitutional conflict.103 Where a plausible interpretation of a statute will 
work to avoid a constitutional problem, then that understanding of the stat-
utory purpose should be chosen over another interpretation which would 
put the act in conflict with the Constitution. Thus, this author believes that 
the amendment ought to be construed as liberally as is necessary to save the 
Act and Guidelines. The Supreme Court is more likely to achieve a consen-
sus based on this principle of statutory construction than on whether indi-
vidualized sentencing is required in noncapital cases. Moreover, a liberal de-
parture policy will provide more judicial feedback concerning any important 
factors which the Guidelines fail to take into account, because judges will be 
required to explain their rationale for departing from the guideline sentence 
ranges. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Sometimes it is better if courts avoid tough legal issues. The Guidelines 
are very important because they apply to the vast majority of federal crimi-
nal defendants and because the system is likely to serve as a model for many 
states. This is an important area in which the rule of law would be enhanced 
if the Supreme Court could reach a consensus which would be accepted by 
most of the public and the criminal bar. It is unlikely that "conservatives" 
and "liberals" on the Court could agree on what protections due process 
provides in the area of criminal sentencing. The goals of sentencing have 
changed dramatically over the years. Is the norm in sentencing the fixed 
punishments of the colonial era, the individualized sentencing advocated in 
guage"), aft'd, 418 U.S. 906 (1974); Anderson v. Edwards, 505 F. Supp. 1043, 1048 (S.D. Ala. 
1981) ("where a statute ... is susceptible to two different readings, one reading which would 
make it constitutional and a second reading which would make it unconstitutional, the rule of 
construction is that a court must read the statute to be constitutional. Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 
F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1980) .... "); University of Conn. Chapter AAUP v. Governor, 200 
Conn. 386, 400, 512 A.2d 152, 159 (1986) ("where a statute reasonably admits of two construc-
tions, one valid and the other invalid on the ground of unconstitutionality, courts should adopt 
the construction which will uphold the statute even though that construction may not be the 
most obvious one.") (quoting Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 153, 251 A.2d 49, 55 (1968». 
101. United States v. Perez, 685 F. Supp. 990, 1001 (W.D. Tex. 1988) ("The mitigating 
circumstances upon which a Court may base a departure are so limited by the amended 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b) that the Court is restricted in tailoring the sentence to a defendant even when 
departing from the Guidelines."). 
102. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 465. 
103. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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Williams, or the just desserts oriented approach of recent years? The 1987 
amendment to the Act and the liberal policy of the Commission toward de-
partures provide a sufficient basis for the Supreme Court to conclude that 
the Guidelines do allow sufficient judicial discretion to meet due process 
standards. 
